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I. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
The parties to this appeal are the Appellant, Pamel 
Chaffin (hereinafter Chaff in) , and the Appellee, Albertsons, „n.-, 
(hereinafter Albertsons) . 
II. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
l'ctqe No. 
PARTIES TO THE APPEAL: I 
TABLF ni'' < '< iNTENTN • . - 1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES: ii 
Cases: . ii 
Statutes and • . , ii 
JURISDICTION: ... , 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES: .... J. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 9 
A . I l l I i1 lit' HiXHts 
Ii. Course .... .roceeding? at. v .... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 5 
CONTRADICTORY J-ACT;' AS ALLEGED BY THE PART I Lb ARE 
APPROPRIATE TO ?•£' ''RESENTS ~~ 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST f SLEEF 
MAIi. 
ADDENDUM 
III. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases: Page No. 
Brothers vs. General Motors Corp, 658 P2d 1108, 
1110 (Montana 1983) 10 
Burns vs. Cannondale Bicycle Co, 239 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 10 
Campbell vs. Safeway Stores Inc., 388 P2d 409 
(Utah 1964) 9 
Canfield vs. Albertsons. 841 P2d 1224 (Utah Ct 
App. 1992) 1 
Koer vs. Mayfair Markets, 431 P2d 566 (Utah 1967) 8 
Lindsev vs. Eccles Hotel Co, 284 P2d 477 (Utah 1955) 9 
Silcox vs. Skagqs Alpha Beta, 814 P2d 623 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) 9 
Wvatt vs. Baughman. 239 P2d 193, 198 (Utah 1951) . 10, 11 
Statutes and Rules: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) 1,2 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2(3) (j) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-4(4) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-2a-3 (2) (k) 1 
11 
IV. 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2 (3)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
Jurisdiction is now properly vested in the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 1953 (as 
amended), Sec. 78-2-4 (4) and Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (k). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed 
reversible error by granting Albertsons Motion for Summary 
Judgement and dismissing the appellant's Complaint with prejudicee 
Summary Judgement is appropriate when there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgement as a matter of law. No deference is given to the trial 
courts determination of whether there are material facts in 
dispute, but a review of the facts and inferences drawn therefrom 
are viewed in a light most favorable to the losing party. Any 
doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are resolved in 
favor of the losing party and any legal conclusions are reviewed 
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court. 
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992). Citations 
omitted. 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 56 (c) of the U.R.Civ.P.is the sole determinative 
authority on appeal. 
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Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts; 
"The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter 
of law." 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Chaffin brought this action to recover damages for injuries 
she sustained when she slipped and fell in water left by a floor 
cleaning machine owned by Albertsons in an Albertsons supermarket 
on January 3, 1991 at or about 7:00 a.m. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 11, 1991 which 
defendant answered on December 30, 1991. After interrogatories of 
both parties and the depositions taken of plaintiff and Allen 
Morley, an Albertsons1 agent/employee, a Motion For Summary 
Judgement was filed by Albertsons on May 5, 1993. Oral argument 
was heard on June 23, 1993 and at that time Motion For Summary 
Judgement was denied. Defendants renewed their motion on October 
8, 1993 and this was argued on November 5, 1993 and Summary 
Judgement was granted. The order was signed by Judge Richard H. 
Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah and 
entered on November 15, 1993. 
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VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These facts are largely stated in a light most favorable to 
appellant which is how they must be reviewed by an appellate court 
in reviewing an appeal by the losing party from a Motion For 
Summary Judgement. 
1. That on January 3, 1991, plaintiff drove her automobile 
and parked near the front entrance of the Albertsons Taylorsville 
store located at 1825 West 4700 South sometime between the hours 
of 6:15 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. (Record at 102 and 374). 
2. She entered the market in low heeled pumps and proceeded 
to the bakery near the front of the store. She picked up one bran 
muffin from the bakery and proceeded down another aisle and picked 
up a bottle of soda pop and walked to the back of the store and 
turned left and was walking back to the dairy department. (Record 
at 378 line 23 - 380 line 12, 391 and 455). 
3. She looked up and saw a floor cleaning machine coming out 
of one aisle. (Record at 380-81). 
4. She saw this machine make a turn and proceed down another 
aisle. (Record at 381) . 
5. She took a couple of steps and her feet went out from 
under her. (Record at 381) . 
6. She sat there stunned and dazed for a few minutes and when 
she got up she noticed some sudsy water (Record at 383) and a 
puddle of water approximately one foot in diameter. (Record at 
388-90). 
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7. The floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water was 
purchased and owned by Albertsons. (Record at 343-44). 
8. That the times and hours of the cleaning of the floors by 
the operator of the machine were dictated by Albertsons. (Record 
at 316-17, 342-43). 
9. That the day was clear and cold with the snow having 
fallen a couple of days before the accident. (Record at 373-374). 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Issues of material fact that arise from reasonable 
inferences to be submitted to a jury are present in this case and 
this case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial. 
2. Chaffin does not have to show that Albertsons had notice 
of the wet spot on the floor in which she slipped and fell if the 
following exceptions to the notice requirement are present in this 
case: 
ac That Albertsons purchased, owned, and controlled the 
floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water. 
b. That Albertsons dictated the time that the floor 
cleaning machine was used with the fact that there was 
a conflict with the floor cleaning machine and stocking 
of shelves by Albertson's employee on the morning in the 
Albertsons store. 
3. The following facts; 
a. That the floor cleaning machine had passed over 
the area immediately before plaintiff slipped and 
fell. 
bo That the water in which plaintiff slipped was 
sudsy. 
c. That the spot on the floor was similar to a spot 
of water one would see after mopping a floor; 
4. Give rise to the reasonable inferences that; 
a. Sudsy water in the back of a food store is not 
a hazard that is normally encountered in a store 
unless placed there by such an article as a floor 
cleaning machine. 
b. That sudsy soapy water normally would not be 
tracked in by a user of a market. 
c. That the floor cleaning machine left the wet 
spot that Chaffin slipped in. 
5. The collective wisdom of a jury is great enough to 
determine and make a factual finding of whether or not there is a 
reasonable inference this water came from the floor cleaning 
machine or was left by a phantom shopper. 
6. Summary judgement was inappropriate in this case and this 
should be remanded to the District Court for trial. 
X. 
ARGUMENT 
CONTRADICTORY FACTS AS ALLEGED BY THE PARTIES ARE APPROPRIATE 
TO BE PRESENTED TO A JURY. 
By the facts of this case there is no doubt the appellant did 
slip in the subject Albertson's store. Thus the questions to be 
presented to the jury are "What was the substance on the floor the 
appellant slipped in?" and "How did the substance arrive upon the 
floor?" 
Albertsons has alleged that their employees/agent saw no 
moisture on the floor before or after the fall. Kurt Treasure, 
Meat Department Manager of the Albertsons, stated in an affidavit 
to the Court that he had inspected the floor ten to fifteen minutes 
before Chaffin fell and did not observe any water or any other 
foreign debris on the floor at that time. Record at 94-96. 
Appellant does not dispute this statement. However, the Court must 
5 
keep in mind that the basis of the appellant's argument was that 
the water was laid down by the floor cleaning machine almost 
immediately before the fall. Thus his statement further gives 
credibility to the inference that the water was deposited by the 
machine approximately 15 minutes after Treasure's viewing the area. 
Record at 318-19 and 365. 
Certainly in presenting this to a jury the issue of 
credibility must come up. As in any case presented to a jury the 
credibility of the witness must be weighed and accounted for by 
the jury. In this matter the appellant is making a claim that she 
slipped in soapy water immediately after seeing the floor cleaning 
machine. Record at 381-383. The appellee's employees/agents have 
submitted affidavits alleging no substances were on the floor 
before or after the fall which certainly must be looked at with 
some suspicion. And the testimony of the third-party defendant, 
Alan Morley, also a favorable witness for the appellee's case, 
should be looked at with some suspicion as Albertson's has filed 
a third party claim against him for indemnification should a 
favorable verdict be rendered for Chaffin. Record 24-4 0. 
A jury should be allowed to make their own factual conclusion 
based upon common sense facts raised by the appellant when such 
facts and circumstances are looked at most favorably for her by 
this court. 
Appellees state that Morley cleaned the outside aisles of the 
store in the rear of the store one to one and a half hours before 
the slip and fall. However, in looking at Morley's map of the 
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accident scene it clearly shows his machine was making a turn 
entering the back aisle thereby placing him and the machine 
directly over the area where Chaffin slipped just seconds later. 
Record at 315. And Morley stated he cleaned that area at 
approximately 7:00 with the accident occurring immediately 
thereafter and he turned around and saw her on the floor where he 
had just cleaned. Record at 318-19 and 321-22. The incident 
report submitted by Chaffin states the accident occurred at 7:05. 
Record at 102. As a matter of common sense the jury could 
understand the idea that the floor cleaning made a sweeping 
circular turn to go from aisle to aisle and it was at that time 
that the soapy water was deposited by the machine. 
Chaffin, by placing the machine in the immediate area at the 
spot immediately before she fall, has raised an inference that the 
machine left the soapy water. 
Again the collective knowledge of a jury would be able to 
ferret out the facts and render a decision in this matter. 
Chaff in has not stated it was just a wet substance she slipped 
in, but has affirmatively testified it was a sudsy spot. Record 
at 383. The machine did use soapy water to clean the floors. 
Record at 309. Again it is for a jury to decide if it was soapy 
water laid down by the machine which left the spot or whether is 
was "a customer spilling water, soda pop, another product, or even 
moisture coming from the shoe of a customer.11 Appellee's brief at 
26. 
Here we have a retail grocery store getting ready for a busy 
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day with a few customers and eight to fifteen employees roaming the 
store. Record at 34 6. The accident occurred in the back of the 
store far from the entrance on a relatively pleasant dry winter 
day. Record at 373-74. 
It is not conjecture or speculation for a jury to deduce; 
1. The machine left the soapy water, or 
2a. A phantom shopper tracked in the water on their shoes all 
the way to the back of the store, stood in one spot and left the 
wet spot, or 
2b. A shopper accidently spilled water, soda or some other 
product in the exact spot the machine had just passed over in which 
the appellant slipped. 
If the floor cleaning machine was working properly as 
Albertsons alleges, the machine should have cleaned up any foreign 
substance on the floor as it passed over that spot. There is no 
testimony in the record that another shopper intervened in the 
seconds after the machine went over the spot and the time when 
Chaffin slipped. Thus, the only source of foreign substance on the 
floor would be the machine and it would be contrary to Albertsons 
argument to state that the machine worked properly and then in the 
next breath state that it was a foreign substance on the floor 
which their machine did not clean up that Chaffin slipped in. 
Chaffin believes that appellees reliance on Koer vs Mayfair 
Markets, 431 P2d 566 (Utah 1967) is inapplicable. Koer involved 
a patron slipping on a grape on an aisle that other shoppers were 
using and that such accident occurred in the meat department, over 
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eighty-eight feet away from the produce department. In Koer the 
Court agreed that just because a grape was on the floor where a 
store manager had walked minutes before that there was no 
presumption of constructive notice of the danger and therefore 
there was no negligence by Mayfair Market. Chaffin argues that no 
notice is necessary in this case as Albertsons created the 
dangerous condition. Notice to Albertsons of the condition is not 
relevant if it is determined by the fact finder that their machine 
left the soapy water on the floor. 
Appellees also rely on Lindsey vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 284 
P2d 477 (Utah 1955). In quoting Eccles the appellees believe 
Chaffin fails to satisfy her burden as to how the water got onto 
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there 
or that Albertsons had knowledge of its presence. 
Based upon the facts presented, a jury could easily find the 
soapy water was deposited by the floor cleaning machine at 
approximately 7:00 a.m. and Albertson's knowledge of such event is 
irrelevant as they controlled the machine and the situation in 
which the water was deposited. 
This case is more closely aligned with Campbell vs. Safeway 
Store, 388 P2d 409 (Utah 1964) and with Silcox vs Skaggs Alpha 
Beta, 814 P2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Both these cases give 
guidance to the ultimate question for the jury; "Is the probability 
greater than not that the substance on the floor of the Albertsons 
store in which appellant slipped was left by the floor cleaning 
machine or by an unknown phantom shopper?" 
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This case is very far removed from the appellee's cited case, 
Burns vs Cannondale Bicycle Company, 239 Utah Adv. Rep 57 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994) a case decided by this court in May of 1994. In that 
case the plaintiff/appellant stated he purchased a bicycle and he 
had returned it for repairs. After receiving the bike back Burns 
was injured and suit was filed. The Court rejected the appellant's 
argument stating that just because an accident occurred negligence 
was not presumed. Further "the accident could have resulted from 
Burns own overly exuberant manipulation of the brakes; a hazard in 
the road; or even the post-sale tampering with, or entry of some 
foreign object into the brake mechanism.11 Burns at 57. 
In Burns the court cited as dicta from a Montana case, 
Brothers vs General Motors Corp, 658 P2d 1108, 1110, (Montana 
1983) , that if a plaintiff rests on circumstantial evidence the 
plaintiff must eliminate alternative causes of an accident. This 
seems somewhat in contradiction with Wyatt vs. Baughman, 239 P2d 
193, 198 (Utah 1951) raised in the appellant's first brief. 
However, with her presentation of an inference of negligence 
Chaffin believes that she has eliminated other events and sources 
that may have caused the spot of water on the floor in conjunction 
with the fact that the machine passed over the area immediately 
prior to her falling. This includes her testimony that the water 
she slipped in was e japy and the fact that the machine used soapy 
water. In eliminating other causes, Chaffin did not vary in her 
testimony that it w**s any other substance and the fact that the 
store was relatively uncrowded and an early time of day in the far 
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back part of the store with a properly functioning machine gives 
a set of facts that would allow a jury to eliminate all causes 
except for the machine as the source of the water• 
The appellant has raised an inference of negligence based upon 
the known facts when viewed in a light most favorable to her. This 
case should be allowed to be presented to a jury as ,f. . . . the 
question there is a factual one unless there is uncontradicted, 
positive, and competent evidence one way or the other that 
negligence did [or did not] exist which would enable the court to 
direct a verdict." Wyatt, 196-97. (Emphasis by court.) 
XI. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The appellant has met her burden for a factual question to be 
presented to a jury by stating the facts that the machine passed 
over the spot prior to her stepping in that spot and this machine 
used soapy water and she slipped in soapy water. There appears to 
be no evidence that there was any other type of substance on the 
floor that another party deposited except by the agent of 
Albertsons. Thus this Court must look at the ultimate question 
that the appellant would frame for a jury in this matter which is: 
From the facts and inferences that can be drawn from these 
facts, is there are greater probability that the floor 
cleaning machine left a puddle of soapy water or that a 
phantom shopper left an unknown substance on the floor in 
which the appellant slipped? 
Based upon this one question and the facts presented by the 
parties, Summary Judgement in this matter was inappropriate and 
11 
this matter should be remanded back to the District Court for 
trial. 
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